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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 20187 
W. REID HORNEf 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
May the trial court/ pursuant to settlement 
of an action regarding division of marital property, and 
in accordance with Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp. 
1983), enter an order nunc pro tunc to the date the settlement 
agreement was entered into in open court? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
(1) Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l (Supp. 1983): 
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction 
mayf upon its finding of good cause and giving of 
such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc 
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, 
legal separation or annulment of marriage. 
(2) Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, Rule 4.5(b): 
Stipulations. No orders, judgments or decrees 
upon stipulation shall be signed or entered unless 
such stipulation is in writing, signed by the 
attorneys of record for the respective parties 
and filed with the clerk, provided that the 
stipulation may be made orally in open court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the entry by the trial 
court nunc pro tunc of an order of distribution of property 
incident to a previously granted divorce. 
Course of Proceedings 
This is a bifurcated divorce action in which the 
parties were divorced on January 27, 1984, with division 
of the parties' property reserved for later determination. 
On June 20, 1984, following the first two days of the trial 
of the property aspects of the case, the parties entered 
into an oral property settlement on the record. A dispute 
arose over the tax conseguences of the agreement, and 
on August 17, 1984, the District Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its Order of Distribution 
of Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, 
Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters in which all 
reference to taxability had been stricken. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Over objection of Defendant, the court, on 
August 17, 1984, entered its Order of Property Divison nunc 
pro tunc to June 20, 1984. 
Facts 
Plaintiff, Don W. Home, and Defendant, W. Reid 
Home, were married on January 17, 1970. Plaintiff filed 
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for divorce on February 19, 1980. The District Court 
ordered the divorce and property settlement issues in the 
proceeding bifurcated. On January 27, 1984, the parties 
were divorced. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant brought substantial 
premarital property into the marriage, and the parties 
accumulated substantial property during the marriage. Trial 
of the division of property portion of the case began on 
June 19, 1984, and was scheduled to run four days. On the 
second day of trial, after the Plaintiff had testified, the 
parties reached a settlement agreement. The settlement 
agreement was read into the record that afternoon in the 
presence of the parties, their counsel, and the court. 
At one point, as the stipulation was being read into the 
record of the court, the comment was made by Plaintiff's 
counsel that "(The property) will be transferred to (Plaintiff) 
as an exchange item to equalize the marital assets of the 
parties in this matter." (Transcript of June 20, 1984 
hearing, page 3.) After listening to the terms of the 
stipulation, the court asked each party if they were in 
agreement therewith. Each party responded affirmatively, 
whereupon the court stated "I will approve the 
stipulation..." 
The parties were later unable to agree on the tax 
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effects of the stipulation entered into on June 20, 1984. 
Consequently, a hearing was held on August 8, 1984, wherein 
the parties expressed their disagreement over the effect of 
the stipulation. Defendant's attorney argued that the 
stipulation was intended to give Defendant tax benefits 
under the rules stated in United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 
65 (1962) and subsequent law. Plaintiff's attorney argued 
that there was no such intent, and that Plaintiff would 
never have entered into such an agreement under those 
circumstances as it would involve negative tax consequences 
to her. The only evidence to support Defendant's version of 
the stipulation was the statement of Plaintiff's counsel 
that the property split was an "exchange item to equalize 
marital assets". 
The court held that the June 20, 1984 stipulation 
was not intended to confer tax benefits on Defendant. (Id. 
at 65.) The court stated its belief that Plaintiff's use of 
the quoted language was not intended as a "term of art". 
(Id. at 66.) The court further noted that neither party 
specifically discussed tax concerns such as stepped-up 
basis, carry over basis, etc. (JEcL at 67.) Finally, the 
court ruled that its order would be issued nunc pro tunc to 
June 20, 1984, due, in part, to a recent change in the tax 
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law which would prejudice Plaintiff if the order were not 
issued nunc pro tunc. (Id. at 64.) The nunc pro tunc order 
was signed by the lower court on August 17, 1984. Defendant 
filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 1984. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court of appeals should not overturn 
the ruling of the lower court in discretionary matters 
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. The finding 
of "good cause" to enter a nunc pro tunc order in divorce 
matters is discretionary with the trial court. 
2. There was "good cause" for the court to enter 
an order nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984. This good cause 
existed, among other things, in the court's finding that 
the order signed August 17, 1984 had actually been entered 
as of June 20, 1984. The findings of the trial court on this 
point should not be disturbed unless no evidence exists to 
support such findings. 
3. There was no exchange whereby Plaintiff 
dropped charges against her attorney in return for entry of 
the order nunc pro tunc. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ROLE OF APPEALS COURTS GENERALLY IN 
REGARDS TO DISCRETIONARY MATTERS 
Before considering the issue in this case in 
depth, it would be well to review the rules governing 
appeals courts generally. 
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The rule is well settled that decisions of lower 
courts which are discretionary will not be overturned unless 
there has been a "clear abuse of discretion". As was stated 
in Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 
555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976): 
...Ordinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting 
within the scope of its authority, has conducted a 
hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing 
court...will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower 
tribunal, except upon a showing that the tribunal 
acted in excess of its authority or in a manner 
so clearly outside reason that its action must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
The issue which the court is called upon to decide 
in this case—whether "good cause" existed to issue an 
order nunc pro tunc—is one committed to the discretion of 
the trial court. (See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stewart 
in Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1984), wherein 
he states that Utah Code Annotated §30-4a-l "commits broad 
discretion to trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders 
in domestic relations matters.") 
This court should therefore exercise extreme 
caution before determining that the lower court acted "in a 
manner so clearly outside reason that its action must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary." (Peatross, supra.) 
II. 
THE COURT HAD GOOD CAUSE TO 
ENTER ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC 
A. Meaning and Effect of Order "Nunc Pro Tunc". 
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The term "nunc pro tunc" means literally "now 
for then". As the court in Preece, supra, discussed, 
nunc pro tunc orders are generally issued "...to enter 
now for then an order previously made." (682 P.2d at 
299.) Regardless of the impact of Utah Code Annotated 
§30-4a-l then, surely a court could not be held to have 
exceeded discretionary bounds if it was merely entering 
a nunc pro tunc order "to enter now for then an order 
previously made." A careful review of the record in 
this case reveals that such was exactly the intent of 
the lower court when it issued its nunc pro tunc order 
on August 8, 1984. 
B. Oral Stipulations entered into in open court 
are binding and valid when approved by the 
Court. 
Rule 4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah 
provides that "...orders, judgments or decrees upon stipulation 
shall (not) be signed or entered unless such stipulation is 
in writing. . .provided that the stipulation may be made orally 
in open court." The implication of the latter clause of 
this rule is that a judgment or decree may be entered 
based on a stipulation made orally in open court. Case law 
from other states supports this conclusion. In Jones v. 
Gladney, 339 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Alabama 1976), the court 
stated that "...Agreements made in open court...are binding, 
whether such agreements are oral or written." And in 
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Sparaco v. Tenney, 399 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Conn. 1978), the 
court held "A stipulated judgment made in open court is 
not within the statute of frauds, and therefore it would 
not be error for the trial court to act upon an oral 
stipulation..." 
C. Parties entered into Oral Stipulation in open 
court on June 20, 1984 and became bound 
thereby on such date. 
As this court is by now well aware, a hearing 
was held in the chambers of the lower court on June 20, 
1984. At this time, attorneys for the respective parties 
declared that a stipulation had been agreed to by the 
parties which the parties desired to enter on the records 
of the court. The attorneys then orally declared the terms 
of this stipulation, after which the court asked each of 
the parties if they were in agreement with the terms of 
the stipulation as stated. When each party expressed 
approval, the court stated "I will approve the stipulation 
of settlement..." At this moment in time, pursuant to 
Rule 4.5(b) and the other authorities quoted above, an 
order of the court was entered. 
The transcript of the hearing held August 8, 1984 
contains indication that Judge Rigtrup entered the 
order nunc pro tunc because of his feeling that the 
order had already been entered. At page 65 of the 
transcript, in discussing his decision to enter the 
order nunc pro tunc, Judge Rigtrup makes a comment to 
the effect: "...if it (the order) had been timely 
submitted..." It appears that Judge Rigtrup was 
expressing the opinion that entry of the order nunc pro 
tunc was proper in that he would have signed the order 
on June 20, 1984, or any time prior to July 18, 1984, 
if it had been submitted. 
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When the court determined on August 8, 1984 to enter its 
order nunc pro tunc to June 20, it was merely correcting the 
record to make it speak the truth. This is the traditional 
purpose of a nunc pro tunc order, and it was therefore 
clearly not error for such nunc pro tunc order to be entered. 
Ill 
COURTS FINDING AS TO PARTIES INTENT ON JUNE 20, 
1984 WAS SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND IS NOT 
REVERSIBLE 
The decision rendered by this court on or about 
May 18, 1987 appears to have taken into account, to some 
extent, the above argument. At page 8 of the opinion, 
it is stated "If the court had entered its order nunc pro 
tunc to give effect to the parties1 expressed intentions 
prior to the change in the tax laws, good cause no doubt 
would exist." However, this court then ruled that such 
was not the intent of the trial court. This court noted 
the language contained in the agreement reached between 
the parties on June 20, which stated "(The property) will 
be transferred to (Plaintiff) as an exchange item to 
equalize the marital assets of the parties in this matter." 
(Id.) This court concluded that such language must be 
interpreted to be "tax language". This conclusion is in 
direct conflict with that reached by the trial court, which 
considered the same issue, and held that it should not be 
construed as "tax language". (Transcript of August 8, 1984 
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Hearing, Page 66-67.) 
At this point, it is well to remember that the 
Court of Appeals should not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court when the conclusion reached by the 
trial court has support in the evidence. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 
881, 883 (Utah 1983): 
On review, this court is obliged to view the 
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom in a light most supportive of the 
findings of the trier of fact. The findings and 
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed 
when they are based on substantial, competent, 
admissible evidence ... 
While it is true that in eguity cases, this 
court may review guestions of both law and fact, 
we are not bound to substitute our judgment for 
that of the trial court, and because of its 
advantaged position, we give considerable deference 
to its finding and judgment. 
Also, in Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 
512, 514 (Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated: 
The findings and conclusions of the District 
Court must be affirmed unless there is no reasonable 
basis in the evidence to support them. Further, 
the evidences and all inferences that fairly and 
reasonably might be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in a light most favorable to the judgment entered... 
This court will not substitute its view of the 
evidence for that of the District Court. 
With the above in mind, the question then becomes, 
"Was there any evidence to support the trial court's deter-
mination that the stipulation of June 20, 1984 did not 
involve tax considerations?" The answer to this question is 
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in the affirmative. 
The record reveals that the trial court was 
reminded of the statement quoted above to the effect 
that there was to be a property division to equalize marital 
assets. The trial court responded "I don't think that 
was intended as a term of art, particularly." (Transcript 
of August 8, 1984 hearing, page 66.) Later on, the lower 
court specifically states "...there was no discussion 
on the record with regard to basis or stepped-up basis or 
any specific discussions on the record with respect to tax 
consequences." (_Id_. at 67.) 
In essence, the lower court was stating: "I was 
there at the June 20 hearing. I have reviewed the transcript 
of that hearing. I have listened to the arguments of respective 
counsel regarding the intent of the parties in entering 
into the stipulation on June 20. I find that the evidence 
indicates the parties did not intend that Defendant have 
any Davis-type benefit when the stipulation was entered 
into. Had they had such intent, they would have been more 
specific." This is a reasonable conclusion, and one warranted 
by the evidence. The conclusion should therefore not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
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IV. 
THERE WAS NO EXCHANGE OF NUNC PRO 
TUNC ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF MISCONDUCT CHARGES 
The appellate court in its decision alludes to the 
possibility that Judge Rigtrup's nunc pro tunc order was 
made, in part, because of Plaintiff dropping her claim of 
counsel for alleged misconduct. After careful review 
of the entire record, respondent's counsel finds nothing 
in the record that would indicate that there was any exchange 
of the nature alleged. Admittedly, misconduct charges 
were dropped* However, this was in accordance with the 
arguments presented at the August 8, 1984 hearing to the 
effect that the whole matter had already been resolved as of 
June 20, 1984, and that the misconduct charges were therefore 
unwarranted and in violation of statute. (Transcript of 
August 8, 1984 hearing, pages 4-5.) 
Even if there was such an exchange, Judge Rigtrup 
still had good cause for entering the order nunc pro tunc in 
accordance with the arguments presented above. The reliance 
on this "exchange" theory was therefore harmless error 
which does not justify reversal of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court entered an order nunc pro tunc 
to June 20, 1984, on the grounds that such was the date the 
parties stipulated to the order, and that the order should 
be therefore effective as of that date. The court further 
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found that the stipulation entered into on June 20, 1984 did 
not confer Davis-type benefits on Defendant. The Court of 
Appeals should not overturn these findings and conclusions 
unless there is no evidence in the record which would 
support such determinations. Since the record supports the 
lower court's statement that neither party discussed Davis-
type benefits on June 20, 1984, the lower court was justified 
in its conclusion that such consequences were not a part of 
the June 20 stipulation. Such finding should not therefore 
be overturned. 
The appeals court's previous comments to the 
effect that Plaintiff dropped misconduct charges against her 
attorney in exchange for the nunc pro tunc order are simply 
not supported by a fair reading of the record. Furthermore, 
such issue is irrelevant in that the court had other "good 
cause" to enter the order nunc pro tunc. 
Respectfully submitted this ay of June, 1987. 
BRAUNBERGER} POULSEN^BOUD, P.C. 
Robert J\ Pou^en 
David A. Wildfe 
Bradley R. Jones 
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